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THE LEGALITY OF PRESIDENT REAGAN'S PROPOSED
SPACE-BASED BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM
I. INTRODUCTION
On March 23, 1983, in a televised address to the Nation, Presi-
dent Ronald Reagan announced a program for the development of
a ballistic missile defense system based on the placement of tech-
nologically advanced weapons in space.' The President stated that,
rather than relying on the "spectre of retaliation" and mutual
threat, the United States should develop a defensive system capa-
ble of destroying nuclear missiles before they reach United States
soil;2 he acknowledged, however, that the complexity of the propo-
sal could delay its completion beyond the end of the century.3
President Reagan also suggested that the proposal did not violate
the ABM Treaty,4 and that the development of such a defense sys-
President's Address to the Nation, National Security, 19 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 442
(Mar. 23, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Star Wars Proposal]. The President gave the address to
gain support for his defense spending proposals. It included a summary of the Soviet mili-
tary buildups, the building of the 10,000-foot runway on Grenada, a mention of arms reduc-
tion talks, and the Star Wars Proposal. Id.
The President announced a Companion National Security Defense Directive on March 15,
1983, beginning a study of the role of ballistic missile defense in the strategy of the United
States. Ballistic Missile Defense Research and Development, 19 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc.
462 (Mar. 25, 1983).
Star Wars Proposal, supra note 1, at 447.
Id. at 448. President Reagan requested assistance in achieving the goals of the Proposal:
"I call upon the scientific community in our country, those who gave us nuclear weapons, to
turn their great talents now to the cause of mankind and world peace; to give us the means
of rendering these nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete." White House officials stated
that the new technologies might include lasers, microwave devices, or particle beam weap-
ons. Reagan Proposes U.S. Seek New Ways to Block Missiles, N.Y. Times, March 24, 1983,
at 1, col. 6.
1 Star Wars Proposal, supra note 1, at 448. Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic
Missile Systems, (May 26, 1972), United States-U.S.S.R., 23 U.S.T. 3435, T.I.A.S. No. 7503
[hereinafter cited as ABM Treaty]. The Soviet press stated that the Reagan plan for an-
timissile technologies, if deployed, could violate the ABM Treaty. Aides Urged Reagan to
Postpone Anti-missile Ideas for More Study, N.Y. Times, Mar. 25, 1983, at 1, col. 3. Ac-
cording to the Reagan Administration, because the Proposal calls for research and develop-
ment, not deployment, it will not violate the ABM Treaty. N.Y. Times, supra note 3, at 21,
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tern could promote successful arms control measures.' The press
subsequently labelled this program "the Star Wars Proposal."'
This Note will discuss the legality of the Star Wars Proposal in
light of United States treaty obligations, primarily the ABM
Treaty and the Outer Space Treaty of 1967. It will focus upon the
exotic technologies which could be used in a space-based Ballistic
Missile Defense (BMD) system, examining the legality of the pro-
posed systems under current law and evaluating national and in-
ternational proposals for future laws relevant to BMD space
systems.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Militarization of Space
While President Reagan's Star Wars Proposal represents just
the most recent instance of the recognition of the military signifi-
cance of space, it is one of the first proposals to consider the de-
ployment of anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems into space. Both
the United States and the Soviet Union contemplated the develop-
ment of ground-based ABM systems during the mid-1950's s These
early systems were designed to use small nuclear-tipped missiles to
intercept intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).' The militari-
col. 5.
' Star Wars Proposal, supra note 1, at 448.
6 See generally Isaacson, Reagan for the Defense, TIME, Apr. 4, 1983, at 8.
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410,
T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter cited as Outer Space Treaty].
" The concept of an ABM system began at the same time long-range ballistic missiles
became feasible. See Ruina, U.S. and Soviet Strategic Arsenals, in SALT: THE MOSCOW
AGREEMENTS AND BEYOND 34, 59 (M. Willrich and J. Rhinelander eds. 1974). See also Bur-
rows, Ballistic Missile Defense: The Illusion of Security, 62 FOREIGN AFF. 843, 845-47
(1984).
9 Ruina, supra note 8, at 59-63. The first two systems developed by the United States
were the Nike-Zeus and the Nike-X. Both systems used missiles with nuclear warheads to
intercept incoming ICBMs. Both these systems, designed to protect the entire country from
nuclear attack, were considered marginally effective and prohibitively expensive. Cost esti-
mates ranged as high as $50 billion. In 1967, President Johnson scaled down the Nike-X
program and renamed it Sentinel. Its purpose was to protect the nation from a light attack,
either a Chinese attack or an accidental Soviet launch of a few missiles. In 1969, President
Nixon modified the Sentinel system into the Safeguard ABM, designed to protect the Min-
uteman silos. The Safeguard system consisted of a Missile Site Radar and 100 Spartan and
Sprint interceptors. The Spartan was the first line of defense, with a range of several hun-
dred miles, while the Sprint was the second line of defense, with a range of about 25 miles
and a high acceleration of about 100 gravities (gs). The Safeguard system was not very effec-
tive. The Missile Site Radar radar was too vulnerable and expensive; therefore, in 1972 the
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zation of space began in the late 1950's with statements by Soviet
Premier Khrushchev linking the Soviet ability to place rockets in
space to their ability to send nuclear-tipped missiles to any spot on
the globe.'0 Since space is perceived to be the ultimate "high
ground,"" the United States and the Soviet Union have repeatedly
used it for military missions.12 Approximately fifty-six percent of
all United States and sixty-nine percent of all Soviet space shots
have had a military purpose." Currently the space budget for the
Department of Defense (Defense) exceeds that of NASA. 4 The
United States began to develop a new ABM system with new and cheaper radar to defend
its ICBMs. The cost to this point, about $4 billion.
The Soviets first deployed a system around Leningrad in the early 1960's, but it was later
dismantled for ineffectiveness. The Galosh system, which presently surrounds Moscow, was
first deployed in the mid-1960's. It consists of two large radars, several smaller radars, and
64 nuclear-tipped interceptors. The Galosh system is thought to be of limited value given
the small number of interceptors and its limited technical capability. The Soviets have at-
tempted to upgrade the Galosh system with such devices as missiles with "loitering capabili-
ties," the ability to coast to the general area of interception and then restart engines once
the offensive warheads are pinpointed, but the innovations have not greatly improved the
effectiveness of the system. See id. at 59-63. See also STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE
RESEARCH INSTITUTE (SIPRI), WORLD ARMAMENT AND DISARMAMENT YEARBOOK 11-13 (1972).
One of the primary motivations for the ABM treaty was the ineffectiveness of both the
Soviet and the United States systems. Had either side developed an effective ABM system
at this early stage, it is likely that the Treaty would never have been signed. See Willrich,
SALT: An Appraisal, in SALT: THE Moscow AGREEMENTS AND BEYOND 256, 263-64 (M.
Willrich and J. Rhinelander eds. 1974).
10 See W. SCHAUER, THE POLITICS OF SPACE 62 (1976). The launching of the 1,120 pound
Sputnik II on November 3, 1957, and the 2,925 pound Sputnik III on May 15, 1958, demon-
strated sufficient technological capability for a sizeable Soviet guided missile program and
led to the perceived "missile gap." See A. LEE, THE SOVIET AIR AND ROCKET FORCES 154
(1959).
" Space is the tallest hill in a battlefield. It is the ideal observation point, defensive posi-
tion, and place from which to launch a surprise attack. See Deudney, Unlocking Space, 53
FOREIGN POL'Y 91, at 93-94 (1983-84). See also G. STINE, CONFRONTATION IN SPACE 50-52
(1981).
1" The current military uses of space include: 1) communications, command, and control
satellites; 2) navigation satellites; 3) weather satellites; 4) surveillance satellites; 5) mapping
and geodesic satellites; 6) reconnaissance satellites; and 7) intercontinental ballistic missiles
(ICBMs) and other ground to ground ballistic missiles which pass through space. ("Space"
in this context begins at the lowest point at which a satellite can orbit the Earth, approxi-
mately 100 miles.) See G. STINE, supra note 11, at 16. See also Reed and Norris, Military
Use of the Space Shuttle, 13 AKRON L. REV. 665, 666-71 (1980).
" See HOUSE COMM. ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, 96TH CONG., 2D SESS., UNITED STATES
AND SOVIET PROGRESS IN SPACE: SUMMARY DATA THROUGH 1979 AND A FORWARD LOOK 41
(Comm. Print 1980). In the past 25 years, 890 out of 1,317 Soviet launches and 427 out of
760 United States launches have been launches of military spacecraft. See also Magno, Mili-
tary Space Programmes, 25 PROC. OF COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 127 (1982).
"4 The Fiscal Year (FY) for Department of Defense space activities equalled approxi-
mately $8.5 billion while the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) FY
1983 budget equalled $6.8 billion. The requested FY 1984 space budget equals $9.3 billion,
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same dominance of the military exists in the Soviet space pro-
grams.' 5 Although Congress declared in 1958 that the United
States would use space for peaceful purposes, the military has con-
tinued to play a significant role in space."'
B. The Exotic Technologies
There are two exotic technologies which currently are considered
the best prospects for a space-based defense system: high energy
lasers and particle beam weapons. Together, these are known as
directed energy weapons.'
The high energy laser is the first of the technologies to be inves-
tigated under the Star Wars Proposal. 8 The adaptation of laser
technology for use as a-weapon first became feasible with the de-
velopment of the high energy laser in 1967.19 Since that time, nu-
merous Defense programs have examined this laser's capacity for
while NASA's requested FY 1984 budget equals $7.1 billion. See Smith, Space Policy and
Funding: Military Uses of Space, Congressional Research Service Issue Brief No. IB82117,
Library of Congress, 10-11 (Nov. 29, 1982, updated Aug. 2, 1983).
"5 Since the Soviet Union is outspending the United States in space and estimates of the
percentage of Soviet launches made for military purposes range from about 66.6% to 70%,
the Soviet military space budget presumably exceeds both the United States military spAce
budget and the Soviet civilian space budget. See Soviets Outspending U.S. on Space by $3-
4 Billion, AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECH., July 14, 1982, at 28. See also Butler, Peaceful
Use and Self Defense in Outer Space, 25 PROC. OF COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER
SPACE 77, 79 (1982). See generally STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON AERONAUTICAL AND SPACE
SCIENCES, 94TH CONG., 2 D SEs., REPORT ON SOVIET SPACE PROGRAMS, 1971-75 OVERVIEW, FA-
CILITIES AND HARDWARE, MANNED AND UNMANNED FLIGHT PROGRAMS, BIOASTRONAUTICS, CIVIL
AND MILITARY APPLICATIONS, PROJECTS OF FUTURE PLANS (Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter
cited as SOVIET SPACE PROGRAMS].
16 National Aeronautics and Space Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2451 (1958). "The Congress hereby
declares that it is the policy of the United States that activities in space shall be for peace-
ful purposes for the benefit of all mankind." Id. at § 102(a). See generally D. RITCHIE, SPACE
WAR (1982). For a thorough bibliography on the military role in space and the current ABM
debate, see id. at 197-220.
" See HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 96TH
CONG., 1ST SESS., FISCAL YEAR 1984 ARMS CONTROL IMPACT STATEMENT: STATEMENTS SUBMIT-
TED TO THE CONGRESS BY THE PRESIDENT PURSUANT TO SECTION 36 OF THE ARMS CONTROL AND
DISARMAMENT ACT 122-37, 244-72 (Joint Comm. Print 1983) [hereinafter cited as FY 1984
ARMS CONTROL IMPACT STATEMENT]. See generally G. STINE, supra note 11, at 99-120; The
New Military Race in Space, Bus. WEEK (June 4, 1979), at 136.
IS See N.Y. Times, supra note 1, at 1. "Laser" is an acronym for Light Amplification by
Stimulated Emission of Radiation. Laser radiation is coherent radiation; the radiation is at
one frequency with all cycles in phase. See G. STINE, supra note 11, at 100.
'9 That first high energy laser was the carbon dioxide gas dynamic laser. See OFFICE OF
THE UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE FOR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, FACT SHEET: DOD
HIGH ENERGY LASER PROGRAM 3 (Feb., 1983) [hereinafter cited as DOD HIGH ENERGY LASER
PROGRAM].
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destroying specific targets.2 0 Currently, Defense programs are stud-
ying the use of space-based high energy lasers for both anti-satel-
lites and ballistic missile defense systems.21 Funding for high en-
ergy laser research has increased significantly in the past few years,
with a budget of $374 million in fiscal year 1983 and a requested
budget of $468 million for 1984.22
The particle beam is the second exotic technology to be investi-
gated as a possible space-based BMD system.23 United States re-
20 Many tests of high energy laser weapons have been made to date. The Air Force con-
ducted the first successful test in 1973, when a ground-based high energy laser shot down a
winged drone. In 1976, the Army used its Mobile Test Unit to shoot down a drone; in 1979,
the Navy, using a laser developed by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(DARPA) shot down an anti-tank missile. See Lasers Light Up the Battlefield, HIGH TECH.,
Nov/Dec 1981, at 78; DOD HIGH ENERGY LASER PROGRAM, supra note 19, at 4-5; see also E.
FESSLER, DIRECTED-ENERGY WEAPONS: A JUDICIAL ANALYSIS 5-6 (1979).
21 The current Defense program to develop a high energy laser weapons system in space is
being conducted by DARPA. The DARPA program consists of three "legs" known as the
"space laser triad." See Ulsamer, Advanced Technology in Space, AIR FORCE MAGAZINE,
June 1981, at 99. The first leg of the triad is Alpha. It is a high power hydrogen-flouride
chemical laser. The second leg, LODE, is an attempt to develop the optics and mirror sys-
tem for a laser battle station. The third leg is Talon Gold, a system to track and pinpoint
targets. Boeing's program, SITT, is an attempt to develop a system to integrate the three
legs of the triad. See Andelman, Space Wars, 44 FOREIGN POL'Y 94, 194-95 (1981).
The DARPA triad was originally proposed as an anti-satellite system. See Smith, Anti-
satellites (Killer Satellites), Congressional Research Service Issue Brief No. 1B91123, Li-
brary of Congress (Aug. 1981, updated Aug. 1983) [hereinafter cited as Antisatellites]. The
DARPA triad could be upgraded, however, into a space-based BMD system. See Robinson,
GAO Pushing Accelerated Laser Program, AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECH., Apr. 12, 1982,
at 16 [hereinafter cited as Robinson, GAO]; see also Robinson, Defense Dept. Backs Space-
Based Missile Defense, AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECH., Sept. 27, 1982, at 13 [hereinafter
cited as Robinson, Defense]. The article discusses Defense Secretary Weinberger's endorse-
ment of a space-based BMD system. It also discusses the power levels required for the triad
program for it to function as a BMD system.
22 Total Defense funding on high energy lasers through FY 1983 equals $2.4 billion. In-
cluding the requested funding for FY 1984, the total is approaching $3 billion. DOD HIGH
ENERGY LASER PROGRAM, supra note 19, at 6.
In its report on the FY 1983 request for space-based laser research, the House Armed
Services Committee deleted funding for chemical laser research and replaced it with funding
for a short wavelength laser research. H.R. Rep. No. 482, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 131 (1982).
The Senate made no changes in the space-based laser request in its bill. S. Rep. No. 330,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. 106 (1982). In conference a compromise was reached. The $41 million
Air Force request for chemical lasers was denied and $20 million was added to the funding
for short wavelength lasers. H.R. Rep. No. 479, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982). See Department
of Defense Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 97-252, 96 Stat. 718 (1982).
2' See N.Y. Times, supra note 1, at 1. A particle beam is a stream of highly energetic
atomic or subatomic particles such as electrons, protons, hydrogen atoms, or ions. It be-
comes a weapon by accelerating the atomic particles to near the speed of light, creating a
beam of very high energy density. G. STINE, supra note 11, at 11. The effect of a PB weapon
on an object is similar to that caused by a bolt of lightning. As the particles strike an object
the kinetic energy of the particles is transferred to the object, penetrating it and causing
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search on the development of a particle beam began in 1958,24 with
proposals for a ground-based BMD system." Total funding to date
for particle beam weapons systems through fiscal year 1984 equals
only about $236 million,26 but it will take longer to develop an ef-
fective particle beam weapon than it will take to develop an effec-
tive high energy laser because of the technological complexities as-
sociated with the former. Of the three types of particle beam
weapons, only the neutral particle beam has prospects of becoming
an effective weapon in space.28
The Soviet Union has also pursued the adaptation of exotic
technologies to use in missile defense systems, devoting substantial
resources to high energy laser and particle beam research since the
mid-1960's. 2e A March 1982 Defense report, which was inadver-
secondary radiation. See id. at 11; E. FESSLER, supra note 20, at 18-29; see also OFFICE OF
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, FACT SHEET, DOD
PARTICLE BEAM (PB) TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM 1 (Feb. 1983) [hereinafter cited as DOD PARTI-
CLE BEAM (PB) TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM].
2' Although the Army considered the potential of particle beams weapons as early as
World War II, true research did not begin until DARPA's SEESAW program was begun in
1958. The SEESAW program was cancelled in 1972 because of high costs and technical
problems. See Robinson, Soviets Push of Beam Weapons, AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECH.,
May 2, 1977, at 16, 18. In 1974, the Navy began work on an electron beam program called
Chair Heritage, and in 1976, the Army began a neutral particle beam program. See DOD
PARTICLE BEAM (PB) TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM, supra note 23, at 2-3. See generally HOUSE
COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS.,
FISCAL YEAR 1979 ARMS CONTROL IMPACT STATEMENTS: STATEMENTS SUBMITTED TO THE CON-
GRESS BY THE PRESIDENT PURSUANT TO SECTION 36 OF THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT
ACT 224-33 (Joint Comm. Print 1978). In 1981, Defense transferred all particle beam weap-
ons programs to DARPA. DOD PARTICLE BEAM (PB) TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM, supra note 23,
at 3; see also Army Beam Program Moves to DARPA, AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECH.,
Aug. 4, 1980, at 51.
25 DOD PARTICLE BEAM (PB) TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM, supra note 23, at 3.
2" Total funding through FY 1982 equals approximately $194 million. Funding for FY
1983 equalled $47 million, and requested funding for FY 1984 equals $49.6 million. DOD
PARTICLE BEAM (PB) TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM, supra note 23, at 7. The total funding for par-
ticle beam weapons is only about one-tenth the amount spent on high energy lasers. See
supra note 22 and accompanying text.
27 See ANTISATELLITES, supra note 21, at 9. The time factor is one reason why funding for
laser research is higher than for beam research. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying
text.
28 The neutral beam is considered to be the only likely candidate for space-based develop-
ment because charged-particle beams are affected by the earth's magnetic field. See gener-
ally Benford, Zeus in Orbit, OMNI, Sept. 1981, at 52. Total funding to date on neutral parti-
cle beam systems, including FY 1984 requested, equals approximately $36 million. DOD
PARTICLE BEAM (PB) TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM, supra note 23, at 7.
29 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, SOVIET MILITARY POWER 75-76 (1981). Esti-
mates of Soviet spending on directed energy weapons are 3 to 5 times the United States
effort. See Isaacson, supra note 6, at 10; see also Robinson, GAO, supra note 21, at 19;
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tently released, indicated that the Soviet Union might be capable
of placing a laser weapon in space as early as 1983.30 Whether the
Soviet Union is actually ahead of the United States in research
leading to an effective space-based BMD system is debatable.3
Several other exotic weapons systems are being studied for use
as possible space-based BMD systems, but directed energy weap-
ons remain the most likely choice for future space-based BMD
systems."2
C. The Exotic Technologies Debate
There is some dispute as to whether exotic technologies could,
within the foreseeable future, enable the United States to deploy
an effective BMD system.33 Opponents of a space-based BMD sys-
tem using exotic technologies suggest a number of technical
Payne & Gray, Nuclear Policy and the Defensive Transition, 62 FOREIGN AFF. 820, 832-35
(1984).
" The Defense report was inadvertently read into the record by a Member of Congress
who thought he was addressing a closed session. The statement was later clarified by testi-
mony of Dr. Richard DeLayer, Undersecretary of Defense for Research and Engineering. Dr.
DeLayer stated that 1983 was the earliest possible figure for Soviet deployment of such a
system. The figure was derived from evidence that the Soviets have a five-year lead on the
United States, therefore, since the United States could deploy such a system within ten
years, the Soviets should be able to within five years. DeLaver later predicted that by 1990
the Soviets will probably have deployed a "large, permanent, manned orbital space complex
. . . capable of effectively attacking . . . ground, sea, and air targets from space." See Anti-
satellites, supra note 21, at 6; see also Nuclear Star Wars: Yesterday's Fiction is Today's
Fact, L.A. Times, March 21, 1982, pt. IV, at 3, col. 1; DOD Officials Testify that U.S.S.R.
Could Achieve Initial Operational Capability as Early as 1983, AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE
TECH., March 9, 1982, at 272.
" See Garwin, Charged-particle Beam Weapon?, 34 BULL. ATOM. SCIENTISTS 24 (1978);
see also L.A. Times, supra note 30, pt. IV, at 3, reporting that two Air Force generals testi-
fied that they doubted Soviet technical capabilities to develop such systems as early as De-
Laver stated. See generally Douglas and Thomas, The Great Russian "Death Beam" Flap,
Sci. NEWS, May 21, 1977, at 329. But see Technology Equal to Defend ICBMs, Spacecraft,
AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECH., July 28, 1980, at 33 (reporting that "a variety of sources
• . . discovered a massive Soviet effort to develop and deploy directed-energy weapons, both
high energy lasers and charge particle beams."); Robinson, supra note 24, at 16-23 (includes
General Keegan's assessment of a massive Soviet PB weapon effort); Soviets Build Di-
rected-Energy Weapons, AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECH., July 28, 1980, at 47; Doubts on
Soviet Beam Work Dissolve, AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECH., July 28, 1980, at 47.
3 One such technology under study is the use of an electromagnetic launcher to launch
hyper-velocity projectiles at ICBMs during their boost phases. See Robinson, Panel Urges
Boost-Phase Intercepts, AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECH., Dec. 5, 1983, at 50; see also
USAF Studies Hypervelocity Technology, AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECH., Dec. 5, 1983, at
62. The bulk of the funding is, however, currently going towards research of high energy
lasers and particle beam weapons. See supra notes 22 and 26 and accompanying text.
" For a general discussion of the space-based exotic BMD systems debate, see Deudney,
supra note 11; Onosko, Showdown on the High Frontier, OMNI, Nov. 1983, at 72.
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problems. First, they point out that due to the large size and num-
ber of satellites required to give the United States an effective de-
fense against ballistic missiles, a space-based BMD system would
be beyond any currently conceivable United States launch capabil-
ity.34 Second, the opponents claim that the technology required for
the mirrors, tracking systems, and power requirements for direct
energy weapons will not be available in the time frame outlined in
the Star Wars Proposal.35 Third, the opponents argue that inex-
pensive countermeasures exist which could neutralize the effective-
ness of BMD systems.36 Fourth, the BMD satellites themselves
could be easy targets for anti-satellites. The opponents argue that
even if these technological obstacles to a space-based BMD system
are overcome, the costs of such a system would be prohibitive. 7
Opponents claim that a space-based BMD system, even if it
were almost one hundred percent effective, would still not enhance
the security of the United States. Although the United States, with
its superior technology in this area, could deploy a space-based
BMD system first, the Soviet Union would inevitably develop and
deploy its own system, eliminating any unilateral advantage for the
The opponents of space-based exotic BMD systems suggest a number of technical
problems with the development of an effective system. First, approximately 50 satellites
would be required to insure that at least one would be in position to shoot down Soviet
missiles at all times. Each satellite would be required to shoot down up to 1,000 missiles
within the boost stage in about eight minutes. The fuel requirement would be about 1,000
tons per satellite, a total of 50,000 tons of fuel. Such capabilities would be impossible with
current shuttle technology; given 16 trips per year, it would take 100 years to get all of the
fuel into orbit. See Tsipis, Laser Weapons Fairy Tales, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Apr. 7,
1982, at 22.
"' Opponents assert that current mirror technology is insufficent to create mirrors of the
requisite size and perfection. Another problem is the development of extremely accurate
aiming and tracking mechanisms to enable a laser to destroy the missile; depending on the
power of the laser, the "dwell time" will vary, but tracking is still a problem. See Tsipis,
Laser Weapons, Sc. Am., Dec. 1981, at 51, 54-57.
The Star Wars Proposal contemplates initial deployment by the end of the century. See
supra note 3 and accompanying text.
11 Countermeasures will offset the effectiveness of directed energy weapons and the large
"battlestations in space" will be key targets for anti-satellites, hence the systems will not be
effective in a war environment. See Tsipis, supra note 35, at 55-57. See generally Lasers
Light up the Battlefield, supra note 20, at 78. Some of the countermeasures mentioned are:
making the surface of the missile booster mirrored to reflect lasers; using an ablative sur-
face, as on the Apollo capsule heat shields; or rotating the missile.
"v Cost estimates for an effective BMD system range from about $75 billion to over $500
billion. Compare Deudney, supra note 11, at 101-03 with GENERAL D. GRAHAM, HIGH FRON-
TIER: A STRATEGY FOR NATIONAL SURVIVAL 35-38, 48 (1983) and Onosko, supra note 33, at 74-
75, 78.
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United States." Once both sides developed a BMD system, they
would then race to develop offensive systems to penetrate the new
defenses.39 Furthermore, a space-based BMD system would be the
first target in a preemptive strike. 0 Directed energy weapons in
space could thus have a destabilizing effect.41 Even if not destabi-
lizing, a leakage of just five to ten percent of missiles through a
BMD system could result in catastrophic destruction.42 A recent
study demonstrated that the explosion of a relatively small num-
ber of nuclear warheads could result in severe climatic disruption
and possibly cause the extinction of the human species. 4 3
Proponents of a space-based BMD system dispute these techno-
logical objections. 44 They claim that some systems might not re-
quire such large numbers of satellites and that the satellites could
be made small enough so that United States launch capabilities
could meet the requirements of the system.4 5 The Defense Ad-
vanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is currently studying
the mirror technology, aiming and tracking, and power require-
ments of directed energy weapons, and proponents believe these
problems can and will be overcome within the time frame of the
Star Wars Proposal.46 With regard to the vulnerability of BMD
18 Interview with Dean Rusk, Former Secretary of State, and Woodruff Proffesor of Inter-
national Law, University of Georgia School of Law, in Athens, Georgia (Nov. 28, 1983).
39 See Karas, Implication of Space Technology for- Strategic Nuclear Competition, THE
STANLEY FOUNDATION (Occasional Paper 25, July 1981); Burrows, supra note 8, at 844.
" See Burrows, supra note 8, at 851. If one side struck first, possibly using its BMD
satellites as an anti-satellite, it could launch an offensive strike against a defenseless oppo-
nent while retaining its own defenses. This would increase the likelihood of a preemptive
strike. See Hasselmann, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Article IV of the Outer Space
Treaty and the Relationship to General Disarmament, 25 PROC. OF COLLOQUIUM ON THE
LAW OF OUTER SPACE 99 (1982); see also Onosko, supra note 33, at 143.
" See Vlasic, Disarmament Decade, Outer Space and International Law, 26 McGILL L.J.
135, 165-67 (1980). See generally Burrows, supra note 8.
2 This is the so-called "nuclear winter" scenario which could lead to the extinction of the
human species. See Sagan, Nuclear War and Climatic Catastrophe: Some Policy Implica-
tions, 62 FOREIGN AFF. 257 (1983).
43 Id.
' For an analysis of several of the arguments against ABMs and a rebuttal of the argu-
ments, see F. DYSON, WEAPONS AND HOPE 73-84 (1984).
4 The X-ray laser, because of its small size and because it could be launched by MX
missile boosters, would not be beyond United States launch capabilities. See FUSION ENERGY
FOUNDATION, BEAM DEFENSE: AN ALTERNATIVE TO NUCLEAR DESTRUCTION 40-42, 67-70, 112-20
(1983) [hereinafter cited as BEAM DEFENSE].
One proposed BMD system, claimed to be both feasible and in compliance with applica-
ble treaties, is the High Frontier Program. GENERAL D. GRAHAM, supra note 37.
" See supra notes 21 and 45; see also BEAM DEFENSE, supra note 45, at 63. For a discus-
sion of the technological problems associated with HELs and PBs, see generally Robinson &
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satellites and the possibility of countermeasures, proponents claim
that the countermeasures might themselves be very costly and
technologically difficult and that it will be possible to protect the
BMD satellites.4 7 The lowest cost estimates for defensive systems
are well within an acceptable range.48 An effective BMD system
could enhance the security of the United States by increasing the
uncertainties of a successful preemptive first strike, thus decreas-
ing the likelihood of such an attack.49 Stability and security would
also be enhanced by reducing the threat of accidental nuclear
war.50 Eventually, a BMD system could lead to reduced levels of
offensive arms. 1 While the debate continues, the Administration
has stated its belief that the technology for such systems has
progressed to the point where a concerted research and develop-
ment program is warranted.2
Klass, Technical Survey: Particle Beams, Laser Weapons 1, AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE
TECH., July 28, 1980, at 32-66 [hereinafter cited as Robinson & Klass, Laser Weapons 1];
Robinson & Klass, Technical Survey: Particle Beams, Laser Weapons 2, AVIATION WEEK
AND SPACE TECH., Aug. 4, 1980, at 44-67 [hereinafter cited as Robinson & Klass, Laser
Weapons 2]; Robinson, Study Urges Exploiting of Technologies, AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE
TECH., Oct. 23, 1983, at 50.
47 See generally Robinson & Klass, Laser Weapons 1, supra note 46, Robinson & Klass,
Laser Weapons 2, supra note 46. The possible countermeasures to space-based BMD lasers
could be overcome by using X-ray lasers or particle beam weapons because they destroy
targets instantly and do not have to dwell on the target as do higher wavelength high energy
lasers. See Robinson, Developing Beam Weapons, AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECH., Nov. 7,
1983, at 11. Countermeasures would also inhibit ballistic missile performance capabilities by
limiting their payloads (allowing fewer reentry vehicles) and increasing their costs. Id.
4 See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
See Robinson, Panel Urges Defense Technology Advances, AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE
TECH., Oct. 17, 1983, at 16, 17; Payne & Gray, supra note 29, at 824, 827-29. See also
Onosko, supra note 33, at 143. Proponents claim that an effective BMD system would en-
hance deterrence and increase strategic stability. An effective BMD system would also
strengthen the negotiating position of the United States.
50 Even a limited BMD system could intercept a small number of missiles which are acci-
dentally launched, allowing both sides time to contemplate further action. See Payne &
Gray, supra note 29 at 825-26.
51 To avoid escalating the arms race, both sides would be willing to negotiate a ban on
these BMD systems. Because the possibility of rapid deployment of such systems could
threaten the effectiveness of a first strike of offensive systems, creating an incentive to en-
hance strategic offensive capabilities at great cost, the negotiation of a ban on exotic tech-
nology BMD systems could also lead to negotiations on the limitation of strategic offensive
arms. Robinson, supra note 49, at 17. See Payne & Gray, supra note 29, at 838-39. Cf.
Weinberg & Barkenbus, Stabilizing Star Wars, 54 FOREIGN POL'Y 164 (1984) (arguing that a
limited "point" BMD system could lead to a "defense-protected build-down" of offensive
weapons; stability could be maintained at lower offensive levels by deploying defensive
weapons with a concomitant reduction in offensive arms).
52 "Current technology has attained a level of sophistication where it's reasonable for us




A. The Current Legal Framework
1. Introduction
The Star Wars Proposal currently contemplates only the re-
search and development of exotic technologies which could eventu-
ally lead to an effective BMD system. Though basic research and
development is not generally prohibited by international law, once
the program reaches the testing and deployment stages, legal
problems may arise.
2. United Nations Resolutions
The General Assembly of the United Nations passed several res-
olutions related to the placement of weapons in space in the late
1950's and the early 1960's. U.N. Resolution 1348 (XIII), which es-
tablished the Ad Hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space (COPUOS), demonstrated an international effort to avoid
the extension of national rivalries into the arena of outer space.53
Resolution 1884 (XVIII) called upon all states to "refrain from
placing in orbit around the earth any objects carrying nuclear
weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, in-
stalling such weapons on celestial bodies, or stationing such weap-
ons in outer space in any other manner. ' 54 Resolution 1962(XVIII)55 and Resolution 1963 (XVIII),56 both adopted on Decem-
ber 13, 1963, stated that war in space must be avoided and that
outer space should be developed for peaceful purposes.
Although General Assembly resolutions dealing with substantive
matters are only recommendations, and thus not legally binding on
BMD system, Secretary of Defense Weinberger said that the United States has solved nu-
merous problems which many technical experts believed insurmountable. See Pentagon
Forms Ballistic Missile Defense Executive Committee: Weinberger Says BMD Funds May
be Redirected, DEF. DAILY (March 30, 1983) at 160, 170. Many technical experts believe
BMD systems are feasible, but even without the backing of technical experts, determined
Presidents have, historically, been able to inspire the nation to work technical miracles. See
Sidey, Turning Vision Into Reality, TIME, Apr. 4, 1983, at 14.
The Presidential panel created to consider the Star Wars Proposal concluded that a five
year effort to study BMD systems, costing from $18 billion to $27 billion, was warranted.
See Payne & Gray, supra note 29, at 821; Burrows, supra note 8, at 843.
" G.A. Res. 1348, 13 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 18) at 5, U.N. Doc. A/4009 (1958) (passed on
Dec. 13, 1958).
G.A. Res. 1884, 18 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 15) at 13, U.N. Doc. A/5515 (1963) (passed
on Oct. 17, 1983).
" G.A. Res. 1962, 18 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 15) at 14, U.N. Doc. A/5656 (1963).
16 G.A. Res. 1963, 18 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 15) at 15, U.N. Doc. A/5656 (1963).
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member states,57 these resolutions do represent an international
consensus that outer space be used only for peaceful purposes and
be kept free from nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass
destruction.5 8
3. The Test Ban Treaty
Several provisions of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests
in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water (Test Ban
Treaty)59 could apply to the Star Wars Proposal. The purpose of
the Test Ban Treaty is t o "put an end to the contamination of
man's environment by radioactive substances."' Article I of the
Treaty specifically forbids the testing of any nuclear weapon in
space; therefore, no BMD system requiring a nuclear explosion
could be tested in space."' If, however, a party desires to test such
a device in space, article IV of the Treaty provides that a party
may withdraw from the Treaty upon three months notice if "ex-
traordinary events" related to the Treaty "jeopardized the su-
preme interests" of that party. 2
4. The ABM Treaty
The Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems
(ABM Treaty)6 3 also poses a potential legal constraint on the Star
Wars Proposal. The ABM Treaty attempts to assure each side that
its missiles will penetrate to the other side, thus preserving the
mutual deterrent capability of offensive missiles and curbing the
race for strategic offensive arms. 4 Article I forbids parties from
57 General Assembly resolutions dealing with substantive matters are only recommenda-
tions to member nations; they do not have the effect of law. L. GOODRICH, THE UNITED NA-
TIONS 282 (1959). See S. LAY & H. TAUBENFELD, THE LAW RELATING TO ACTIVITIES OF MAN IN
SPACE 81-87 (1970). See also Kopal, Article IV of the 1967 Space Treaty, Its Present Mean-
ing and Possibilities of Further Development, 25 PROC. OF THE COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF
OUTER SPACE 119 (1983); Bridge, International Law and Military Activities in-Outer Space,
13 AKRON L. REV. 649, 663-64.
'8 See S. LAY & H. TAUBENFELD, supra note 57, at 81-87.
I" Aug. 5, 1963, United States-U.S.S.R., 14 U.S.T. 1313, T.I.A.S. No. 543, 480 U.N.T.S. 43.
60 Id. at preamble.
" Id. art. I(1). "Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes to prohibit, to prevent, and
not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion at any
place under its jurisdiction or control: (a) in the atmosphere; beyond its limits, including
outer space; or underwater .... " Id.
See generally The Legality of Antisatellites, 3 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 467, 476-77 (1980).
62 Test Ban Treaty, supra note 59, at art. IV.
"' ABM Treaty, supra note 4.
6' ABM Treaty, supra note 4, at preamble; see Firmage & Henry, Vladivostok and Be-
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deploying any ABM system except as allowed elsewhere in the
Treaty.6 5 Article III permits each party to deploy two fixed, land-
based ABM systems, prohibiting any other deployment."6 At first
glance, it appears that article I prohibits the deployment of all
types of ABM systems, including space-based directed energy
weapons.
The definition of an ABM system is not altogether clear. Article
II(1) defines an ABM system as "a system to counter strategic bal-
listic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory. 6 8 Looking only
at this clause, article II(1) appears to prohibit any system designed
to intercept and destroy strategic ballistic missiles. Article II(1)
does, however, list three elements which constitute an ABM sys-
yond: SALT I and the Prospects for SALT 11, 14 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 221, 229 (1975);
see also FY 1984 ARMS CONTROL IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 17, at 131.
65 ABM Treaty, supra note 4. "Each Party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems for a
defense of the territory of its country and not to provide a base for such a defense, and not
to deploy ABM systems for defense of an individual region except as provided for in Article
III of this Treaty." Id. art. 1(2).
11 ABM Treaty, supra note 4, at art. III. The number of ABM system sites was later
limited to one, either around the nation's capital or around an ICBM launch site. Protocol
to the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, July 3, 1974, United
States-U.S.S.R., 27 U.S.T. 1645, T.I.A.S. No. 8276 [hereinafter cited as Protocol]. See
HousE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS AND SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 97TH CONG.,
2D SESS., FISCAL YEAR 1983 ARMS CONTROL IMPACT STATEMENT: STATEMENTS SUBMITTED TO
THE CONGRESS BY THE PRESIDENT PURSUANT TO SECTION 36 OF THE ARMS CONTROL AND Dis-
ARMAMENT ACT 140 (Joint Comm. Print 1982) [hereinafter cited as FY 1983 ARMS CONTROL
IMPACT STATEMENT].
67 See E. FESSLER, supra note 20, at 68. Deployment does not, however, include research
and development. Research and development is not prohibited by article I. See The Soviet
Strategic Challenge Under SALT I, CURRENT HISTORY, Oct. 1972, at 150, 152; see also FY
1983 ARMS CONTROL IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 66, at 141, 321-22. "Development",
under the ABM Treaty, is defined as follows:
The obligation not to develop such systems, devices or warheads would be applica-
ble only to that stage of testing. The prohibitions on development contained in
the ABM Treaty would start at that part of the development process where field
testing is initiated on either a prototype or bread-board model.
See FY 1984 ARMS CONTROL IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 17, at 133, 265-68.
*s Article II:
1. For the purpose of this Treaty an ABM system is a system to counter strategic
ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, currently consisting of:
(a) ABM interceptor missiles, which are interceptor missiles constructed and
deployed for an ABM role, or of a type tested in an ABM mode;
(b) ABM launchers, which are launchers constructed and deployed for launching
ABM interceptor missiles; and
(c) ABM radars, which are radars constructed and deployed for an ABM role, or
of a type tested in an ABM mode.
ABM Treaty, supra note 4. See E. FESSLER, supra note 20, at 68; Bridge, International Law
and Military Activities in Outer Space, 13 AKRON L. REV. 649, 654-55 (1980).
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tem. Under article II(1), an ABM system is a system "currently
consisting of": ABM interceptor missiles; ABM launchers; and
ABM radars."' This language is subject to two possible interpreta-
tions.70 If the "currently consisting of" language of article II(1) just
introduces examples of existing ABM systems, the prohibition will
presumably include other systems developed in the future.7 1 If the
"currently consisting of" language is intended to introduce an ex-
clusive list of ABM system components, article II(1) would not
prohibit the development and deployment of future exotic
systems. 2
Statements from the addendum to the ABM Treaty support the
second interpretation of article II(1). Agreed Interpretation [D] of
the ABM Treaty provides that "ABM systems based on other
physical principles" developed in the future must be subject to dis-
cussion by the parties within the Standing Consultative Commis-
sion.73 This statement implies that ABM systems based on "other
physical principles" are not explicitly prohibited by the Treaty.7 4
Any development of such a system based on "other physical princi-
ples" would, however, violate the spirit of the Treaty75 and could
be considered an "extraordinary event, 7 6 thus allowing the other
party to withdraw from the Treaty under article XV. 77
There is one final prohibition under the ABM Treaty. Article V
e ABM Treaty, supra note 4, at art. II.
7 See E. FESSLER, supra note 20, at 68-69.
71 Id.
72 Id.
7' ABM Treaty, supra note 4, at additional protocol.
In order to ensure fulfillment of the obligation not to deploy ABM systems and
their components except as provided in Article III of the Treaty, the Parties
agreed that in the event ABM systems based on other physical principles and
including components capable of substituting for ABM interceptor missiles, ABM
launchers, or ABM radar are created in the future, specific limitations on such
systems and their components would be subject to discussion in accordance with
Article XIII and agreement in accordance with Article XIV of the Treaty.
Id. at agreed interpretation [D] [hereinafter cited as Agreed Interpretation [D§. See FES-
SLER, supra note 20, at 70-77; see also Firmage & Henry, supra note 64, at 232 (both E.
FESSLER and Firmage & Henry discuss Agreed Interpretation [D] though they mislabel it
Agreed Interpretation [E]).
" See E. FESSLER, supra note 20, at 70-77.
75 See Vlasic, supra note 41, at 177; see also Okolie, Legal Requirements for the World's
Protection of Outer Space and Earth Environments Within the Perspective of Directed
Energy Weapons, in 25 PROC. OF COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 25, 30 (1982);
Nacht, ABM ABCs, 46 FOREIGN POL'Y 155, 172 (1982). See generally E. FESSLER, supra note
20, at 66-79.
" See Vlasic, supra note 41, at 177.
" ABM Treaty, supra note 4, at art. XV.
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prohibits the development, testing, or deployment of any ABM
system which is not a fixed, land-based system.78 If directed energy
weapons are considered an ABM system under article II(1), article
V will prohibit their testing or deployment in space.7"
5. The Outer Space Treaty
The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in
the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and
Other Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty) is perhaps the most
important treaty in the area of space law. s0 Article IV of the Outer
Space Treaty81 is a key provision in the attempt to prevent the
militarization of outer space. 2
a. Paragraph One bf Article IV
The first paragraph of article IV prohibits the placement of "nu-
clear weapons or any other weapons of mass destruction" in outer
space, in orbit around the Earth, or on celestial bodies.83 There is
no clear definition of the term "nuclear weapons or any other
weapons of mass destruction" in the Treaty. 4 Article III of the
Outer Space Treaty, however, makes international law and the
78 "Each party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components
which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based." ABM Treaty, supra
note 4, at art. V(1). See Okolie, supra note 75, at 30. See generally FY 1983 ARMS CONTROL
IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 66, at 141, 321.
79 See E. FESSLER, supra note 20, at 71.
80 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 7. See Robinson, Militarization and the Outer Space
Treaty-Time for a Restatement of "Space Law," ASTRONAUTICS & AERONAUTICS, Feb.
1978, at 28.
8' Outer Space Treaty, supra note 7, at art. IV.
States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the Earth any
objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruc-
tion, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer
space in any other manner.
The moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all States Parties to the
Treaty exclusively for peaceful purposes. The establishment of military bases, in-
stallations and fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons and the conduct
of military maneuvers on celestial bodies shall be forbidden. The use of military
personnel for scientific research or for any other peaceful purposes shall not be
prohibited. The use of any equipment or facility necessary for peaceful explora-
tion of the moon and other celestial bodies shall also not be prohibited.
Id.
82 See Gorove, Arms Control Provisions in the Outer Space Treaty: A Scrutinizing Reap-
praisal, 3 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 114 (1973).
"' See supra note 81.
84 Gorove, supra note 82, at 115.
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United Nations Charter specifically applicable to the Treaty.85
The definitions of "nuclear weapon" and "weapon of mass de-
struction" are determinable under the provisions of article 31 of
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 6 Article 31 of the
Vienna Convention provides that a treaty should be interpreted
"in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms
of the treaty. '8 7 In order to determine the definition of nuclear
weapon or a weapon of mass destruction it is first necessary to de-
fine "weapon."88
"Weapon" ordinarily includes "an instrument of offensive or de-
fensive combat, or anything used, or designed to be used in de-
stroying, defeating, or injuring a person." 9 In space law it is ex-
tremely difficult to define the word "weapon." 0 Many things not
generally considered weapons could be used as such in space."
Even peaceful satellites if manuevered properly could be used to
destroy other satellites or objects on the surface of the Earth. One
8 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 7,'at article III provides:
States Parties to the Treaty shall carry on activities in the exploration and use of
outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, in accordance with
international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, in the interest of
maintaining international peace and security and promoting international cooper-
ation and understanding.
Id. See Bridge, supra note 68, at 655.
" Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides general rules for
interpretation and is applicable to the Outer Space Treaty. Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 3927, (May 23, 1969). See Hasselmann, supra note 40, at 100;
Zedalis & Wade, Anti-Satellite Weapons and the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, 8 CALIF. W.
INT'L L.J. 454, 477 (1978).
87 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 86, at art. 31(1).
" See generally Gorove, Limiting the Use of Arms in Outer Space: Legal and Policy
Issues, 25 PROC. OF THE COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 93, 94 (1983).
" BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1429 (rev. 5th ed., 1979). For other dictionary definitions of
"weapon," see Gorove, supra note 88, at 94. Dictionary meanings of "weapon" would seem
to be the "ordinary meaning" of the term, consistent with article 31(1) of the Vienna Con-
vention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 86.
90 See Galloway, Expanding Article IV of the 1967 Space Treaty: A Proposal, 25 PROC.
OF COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 89, 91 (1983). On weapons in space, see G.
STINE, supra note 11, at 74-75.
" For example, ice cubes could be used in space to destroy a satellite. Galloway, supra
note 90, at 91. A payload of six-penny nails delivered to orbit has been cited as a possible
cheap ASAT. G. STINE, supra note 11, at 95. Rocks catapulted from the moon could be used
as weapons to destroy targets on Earth, delivering almost as much destructive force as nu-
clear weapons. See Hasselmann, supra note 40, at 99; see also Deudney, supra note 11, at
112. This idea originally arose in R. HEINLEIN, THE MOON IS A HARSH MISTRESS (1966), a
novel. Even peaceful devices such as the lunar mass driver conceived of as a means to
cheapen construction of space colonies and satellite power stations could be easily converted
into a space "Gatling gun." See G. STINE, supra note 11, at 85. See generally G. O'NEILL,
THE HIGH FRONTIER (1976).
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possible solution is to define a "weapon" as any instrument
designed or intended to be used as such.2
Weapons are not prohibited by article IV of the Outer Space
Treaty. Only nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruc-
tion are prohibited. One definition of nuclear weapons states that
they include "all arms which utilize atomic energy in accomplish-
ing their intended purpose, irrespective of their size or destructive
force."93 Another definition of nuclear weapon would limit the defi-
nition to nuclear explosive devices. 9 4
This second definition of nuclear weapon is supported by the
generally accepted definition of the phrase "weapon of mass de-
struction," a definition first stated by the Commission for Conven-
tional Armaments98 and later reaffirmed by the United Nations
General Assembly. 6 The Commission stated that "weapons of
mass destruction should be defined to include atomic explosive
weapons, radioactive material weapons, lethal chemical and biolog-
ical weapons, and any weapons developed in the future which have
characteristics comparable in destructive effect to those of atomic
bombs or other weapons mentioned above. ' 97 Many weapons which
could be used in space do not easily fit within these four categories
of weapons of mass destruction. 8 It will, therefore, be necessary to
92 This definition would avoid classifying as peaceful those objects which, if their orbits
were manipulated correctly, could be used as weapons. See Gorove, supra note 88, at 94.
93 Gorove, supra note 82, at 115.
" This definition would include nuclear (atomic), thermonuclear (hydrogen), and neutron
bombs. See Commission for Conventional Armaments, U.N. Doc. S/C.3/30 (Aug. 13, 1948)
where "weapons of mass destruction" included "atomic explosive devices," later referred to
as atomic bombs. This would exclude non-explosive devices which utilize nuclear physics as
the source of the weapon. See infra notes 129 and 130 and accompanying text.
"' This was called the "definitive definition" in E. FESSLER, 'supra note 20, at 54. This
definition has been cited by a number of sources, including: Gorove, supra note 88, at 93;
Zedalis & Wade, supra note 86, at 465; Hasselmann, supra note 40, at 106.
This definition was offered by former U.N. Ambassador Goldberg and former Assistant
Secretary of State Vance in testimony before the United States Senate. Hearings on the
Outer Space Treaty before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.
76-77, 100 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on the Outer Space Treaty]. See generally
Mathison, The Law of War and the Juridical Control of Weapons of Mass Destruction in
General and Limited Wars, 36 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 308 (1967).
N Prohibition of the Development and Manufacture of New Types of Weapons of Mass
Destruction and New Systems of Such Weapons, G.A. Res. 32/84B (XXXII) (1977).
" Commission for Conventional Armaments, supra note 94.
98 See Hearings on the Outer Space Treaty, supra note 95, at 76-77 (statement of former
Ambassador Goldberg); see also S. LAY & H. TAUBENFELD, supra note 57, at .27. Conven-
tional weapons, such as lunar rocks catapulted to Earth, would be classified as weapons of
mass destruction because of their destructive capability. See Hasselmann, supra note 40, at
99.
1984]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. [Vol. 14:329
determine whether future weapons in space have "characteristics
comparable in destructive effect" to the weapons specifically enu-
merated in the definition of weapons of mass destruction. One
commentator would classify weapons as weapons of mass destruc-
tion according to the number of people that they destroy. 9 An-
other view would classify any weapon with a large amount of de-
structive force, combined with a lack of control and indiscriminate
destructive effect, as a weapon of mass destruction.1 e0
Nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction are prohib-
ited only if they are "in orbit" around the Earth, "installed" on a
celestial body, or "stationed" in outer space.10 1 The use of the
phrase "in orbit" suggests that weapons which do not achieve a full
orbit are not prohibited by the Treaty.'02 "Stationed" and "in-
stalled" in outer space presumably have a similar meaning to the
"in orbit" phrase.10 3 Although the Moon was not included as a ce-
lestial body in the first paragraph of article IV, it would make little
sense to exclude the Moon from the installation prohibition.10' Any
ambiguity resulting from the omission of the Moon was removed
by the Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon
and Other Celestial Bodies (Moon Treaty).10 5 Article III of the
0 See Gorove, supra note 82, at 115-16 (more than 20-30 people).
100 See E. FESSLER, supra note 20, at 56-57. Even if some weapons have a large destructive
effect, if they are also controllable and discriminating, they might not be classifed as weap-
ons of mass destruction. Id.
1'0 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 7, at art. IV(1). Placement on the Moon or other celes-
tial bodies would also be forbidden, but no BMD systems are contemplated to be stationed
on the Moon or other celestial body.
102 See Gorove, supra note 82, at 116. In a "pop-up" mode, BMD weapons would never be
"stationed," "installed," or "in orbit." Thus, like ICBMs and the Soviet Fractional Orbit
Bombardment System, they would not be forbidden by article IV of the Outer Space
Treaty. See E. FESSLER, supra note 20, at 60-63; Zedalis & Wade, supra note 86, at 461-63;
see also AIR FORCE AND SPACE DIG. 18 (Dec. 1967) (Statement of Secretary of Defense
McNamara on Nov. 3, 1967).
One use of the X-ray laser would place them on MX missile boosters and "pop-up" the
X-ray laser satellites when they are needed. BEAM DEFENSE, supra note 45, at 68. They
would be utilized before achieving a full orbit. Id.
103 The meaning of these two terms is still ambiguous under the Treaty. In outer space an
object must be in some type of orbit to be "stationed" or "installed." The two terms, there-
fore, should be synonymous with the "in orbit" phrase when considering objects which are
in outer space. On the Moon or other celestial body, "stationed" or "installed" should be
given their ordinary meanings. Some degree of permanence is ordinarily associated with sta-
tioning or installation. See Gorove, supra note 82, at 116, 117.
104 Id.
105 U.N. Doc. A/AC. 105/L. 113/Add.4 (1979). The Moon Treaty was approved by the




Moon Treaty prohibits the placement of nuclear weapons or other
weapons of mass destruction in orbit around or on the surface of
the Moon. 06
b. Paragraph Two of Article IV
The second paragraph of article IV limits the use of the Moon
and other celestial bodies to peaceful purposes. 10 7 This peaceful
purposes provision has generally been interpreted in two ways: the
first prohibiting all military activities; the second prohibiting ag-
gressive military activities.
The first interpretation prohibits any activity of a military na-
ture. 108 As in the Statute of the International Atomic Energy
Agency, a distinction is made between peaceful and military activi-
ties.10 9 The Preamble to the Outer Space Treaty indicates a desire
that nations not use space for military purposes.110 Article I has
also been cited in support of this non-military view of "peaceful
purposes". 1 It states that the exploration and use of outer space
must be for the benefit and use of all nations.1 12 It is arguable that
the military use of space by a single nation would not be for the
benefit of all nations.' 3
106 The Moon Treaty, supra note 105, at art. III; see Zedalis, Will Article III of the Moon
Treaty Improve Existing Law: A Textual Analysis, 5 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 53, 57 (1980-
81).
'07 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 7, at art. IV para. 2. This provision was adapted from
an earlier U.N. Resolution. Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of
States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, G.A. Res. 1962 (XVIII), 18 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 15), U.N. Doc. A/5515 (1963). See Jeksetic, The Peaceful Uses of Outer Space:
Soviet Views, 25 AM. U.L. REV. 483 (1979).
"08 This interpretation has been the general Soviet view. According to the official Soviet
view, the peaceful uses of space exclude any activity of a military nature. See Zhukov, Prac-
tical Problems of Space Law, INT'L AFFAIRS 27, 28-29 (May 1983); Jeksetic, supra note 107,
at 493; Vlasic, supra note 41, at 171-72; see generally Zedalis & Wade, supra note 86, at
472-74; and SOVIET SPACE PROGRAMS, supra note 15, at 375-80.
109 See Gorove, Distinguishing "Peaceful" from "Military" Uses of Atomic Energy: Some
Facts and Considerations, 30 OHIO ST. L.J. 495 (1969). This view is supported in the Statute
of the International Atomic Energy Agency, opened for signature Oct. 26, 1956, 8 U.S.T.
1093, T.I.A.S. No. 3873, 276 U.N.T.S. 3, at art. II.
"' Outer Space Treaty, supra note 7, at preamble.
. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 7, at art. I. See Zedalis & Wade, supra note 86, at 472.
's Outer Space Treaty, supra note 7, at art. I.
"' See Zedalis & Wade, supra note 86, at 466. "Such a benefit would not occur if one
nation used it [space] for its own military objectives." Id. It is clear that proper construction
of Article IV, paragraph 2 and Article IV, paragraph 1 prohibits military activity in all outer
space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, because such activities cannot be un-
dertaken in a manner beneficial to the interests of all countries. Id. at 474. But see Menter,
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and National Security, 25 PROC. OF THE COLLOQUIUM ON THE
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The second interpretation of the peaceful purposes provision al-
lows any non-aggressive activity in space." 4 The United Nations
Charter supports this view." 5 Article 2(4) of the Charter does re-
quire states to refrain from "the threat or use of force" against
another nation; article 51, however, permits a nation to defend it-
self." 6 The right of self-defense allows a nation to protect itself
from attack so long as it does not threaten other nations."' The
non-aggressive use of military satellites in space is consistent with
this right of self-defense."' The non-aggressive interpretation of
the peaceful purposes provision is also consistent with the actual
practices of the nations currently utilizing space." 9 Both the
United States and the Soviet Union have used space for a number
of non-aggressive military purposes. 120 The use of space for defen-
sive purposes has become a fait accompli. 21
LAW OF OUTER SPACE 135, 136 (1983). Some military activities in space, such as reconnais-
sance satellites, serve the interest of maintaining international peace and thus benefit all
nations. Goedhuis, Some Observations on the Efforts to Prevent a Military Escalation in
Outer Space, 10 J. SPACE L. 13, 17 (1982); Dore, International Law and the Preservation of
the Ocean Space and Outer Space as Zones of Peace: Progress and Problems, 15 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 1, 54-55 (1982).
"I The United States supports this view. See Gorove, supra note 82, at 119; Vlasic, supra
note 41, at 171-72; Zedalis & Wade, supra note 86, at 472-74.
,' The Charter is made specifically applicable to the Outer Space Treaty by article III.
"Peaceful" in the U.N. Charter is the opposite of "aggressive." See Menter, supra note 113,
at 136.
'16 U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4; art. 51.
M" See Butler, supra note 15, at 77; see also Gorove, supra note 82, at 115; Menter,
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and National Security, 17 INT'L LAWYER 581, 585 (1983);
Zhukov, The Problem of Demilitarization of Outer Space, 25 PROC. OF COLLOQUIUM ON THE
LAW OF OUTER SPACE 113, 114 (1983); Schrader, Comment: Defense in Outer Space, 49
MILITARY L. REV. 157, 158 (1970); c.f., Kolossov, Notions of "Peaceful" and "Military"
Space Activities, 25 PROC. OF COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 117, 118
(1983)("Non-aggressive military activities in outer space have been limited, but not banned.
Such activities might include the use of missiles to repel acts of aggression, the use of vari-
ous space objects. . . as support means ...).
"I See Butler, supra note 15, at 79. Further support for the non-aggressive view comes
from the difficulty in distinguishing military from non-military activities in space. See
Bridge, supra note 68, at 657-58. On the difficulty of defining "weapon", see supra notes 90,
91 and accompanying text (some purely civilian objects could be used as "weapons").
"' The actual practice of nations is made applicable to the interpretation of terms within
the Outer Space Treaty by the Vienna Convention of the Law on Treaties, supra note 86, at
art. 31(3)(b). This is called the "conventional" or "practical" interpretation method. See
Butler, supra note 15, at 78-79.
20 See Vlasic, supra note 41; see also supra note 12 and accompanying text (listing seven
current military uses of space).
22. See Vlasic, supra note 41, at 79; see also Butler, supra note 15, at 79 (discussing the
actual practices of nations in space and the fact that space is being used for defensive pur-
poses); see generally Gal, Activities on Orbit and on Celestial Bodies-Two Nations of
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The peaceful purposes provision of article IV was, however, in-
tentionally limited in scope. 2' Unlike the first paragraph of article
IV, which applies to outer space in general, the second paragraph
specifically applies only to the Moon and other celestial bodies. 23
This limitation may not be as great as it first appears because the
Preamble to the Outer Space Treaty uses the term "peaceful pur-
poses" while discussing outer space in general.'2 4 The paragraph
two requirement of using space exclusively for peaceful purposes
might then apply to earth-orbital space. In light of the separate
provisions within article IV, it appears that the definition of peace-
ful is different in earth-orbital and outer space than it is on the
moon and other celestial bodies regardless of the implications of
the Preamble.2 5 This separation of the Moon and other celestial
bodies from outer space in general is consistent with the current
military use of space.' 2
6
c. Summary
While the Outer Space Treaty demonstrates a general movement
against the militarization of space, article IV appears to only pro-
hibit certain specified military activities.
Peaceful Uses?, 25 PROC. OF COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 83 (1983)(discussing a
number of faits accomplis of the space powers).
122 See Gorove, supra note 82, at 117-18.
"" Outer Space Treaty, supra note 7, at art. IV, para. 2. C.f., Dore, supra note 113, at 45
... the ban is not extended in haec verbu to that area of space around the earth where
only nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction are banned.").
"' Outer Space Treaty, supra note 7, at preamble.
... See Dore, supra note 113, at 47; see also Gorove, supra note 82, at 119-20; Gorove
supra note 88, at 94. (Research is always allowed regardless of its military or civilian pur-
pose, military facilities can be used for peaceful purposes, and some military facilities are
forbidden regardless of whether they are used for "peaceful purposes.").
136 The first paragraph of Article 1 applies to all of outer space, including Earth orbit,
celestial bodies, and outer space in general. The second paragrpah applies only to the Moon
and other celestial bodies. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 7, at art. IV. See Dore, supra
note 113, at 45; see also Zhukov, supra note 117, at 113. See generally Markoff, Disarma-
ment and the "Peaceful Purposes" Provisions in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, 4 J. SPACE
L. 3 (1976).
Both in 1967 and today, no military use is being made of the Moon or other celestial
bodies; however, the military is using space near Earth for a number of purposes. See gener-
ally G. STINE, supra note 11; see also supra note 12.
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B. The Star Wars Proposal Within the Current Legal
Framework
1. The Test Ban Treaty
The testing of any BMD system requiring a nuclear explosion in
space is prohibited by the Test Ban Treaty,12 7 but the X-ray laser
is the only BMD system currently under study that requires a nu-
clear explosion. The X-ray laser would use a small thermonuclear
bomb to generate power to its lasing rods, creating a number of
separately targetable laser beams.128 Since the X-ray laser requires
an atomic bomb, the Test Ban Treaty would prohibit the testing of
these lasers in space.
The Test Ban Treaty could present another problem for the Star
Wars Proposal if directed energy weapons are classified as nuclear
weapons. Since particle beams use atomic particles and high en-
ergy lasers emit beams of coherent radiation, they have been classi-
fied as nuclear weapons. 129 These directed energy weapons do not,
however, require explosions. They are capable of high accuracy and
can limit their destructive force to small, individual targets. They
are, therefore, generally considered to be conventional "point"
weapons and not nuclear weapons. 30
'" See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
128 The X-ray laser is a more effective weapon than other high energy lasers because it
emits a higher frequency of radiation and is thus more powerful. One major drawback of the
X-ray laser is that because the nuclear device used to trigger the laser destroys the satellite,
each satellite can only be fired once. See BEAM DEFENSE, supra note 45, at 40-42, 67-70, 112-
20.
The Test Ban Treaty may be a major hurdle to a BMD system because the X-ray laser is
a likely candidate for an early BMD system. One commentator suggested that development
of X-ray laser technology convinced President Reagan to investigate the possibility of an
effective BMD system. BEAM DEFENSE, supra note 45, at 30. The X-ray laser is also a type of
short wavelength laser which the House of Representatives has been supporting over the
last two years. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. Underground testing at the Ne-
vada test site might suffice, as it has for testing the X-ray laser concept in general. See
BEAM DEFENSE, supra note 45, at 67.
129 "Any test of directed energy weapons in outer space will be in violation of the Test
Ban Treaty. There is no doubt that space testing of any thing of nuclear content will be
verifiable .. " Okolie, supra note 75, at 30. This implies that directed energy weapons
would be considered nuclear weapons, therefore making any test or use in space a violation
of the Test Ban Treaty. Id.
120 See Butler, supra note 15, at 77; see also G. STINE, supra note 11, at 5. Lasers and
particle beams use a limited amount of energy released extremely rapidly to gain their de-
structive effect. A large high energy laser will release about 1 megajoule of energy, the
equivalent of only a half-pound of high explosives. For the effects of particle beam weapons,
see supra note 23 and see Heppenheimer, Dawn of a New Ray, OMNI, Dec. 1983, at 74, 160.
See generally BEAM DEFENSE, supra note 45. If lasers were considered "nuclear weapons,"
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2. The ABM Treaty
The impact of the ABM Treaty on the systems developed under
the Star Wars Proposal will depend upon whether the exotic tech-
nologies are considered to be ABM systems under article 11(1). The
"currently consisting of" language of article II(1)' 1, and Agreed In-
terpretation [D] of the ABM Treaty 132 imply that directed energy
weapons are not prohibited under the Treaty. Any deployment of a
space-based BMD system utilizing directed energy weapons, how-
ever, would violate the spirit of the Treaty. 3 Therefore, it is gen-
erally agreed that despite the implications of Agreed Interpreta-
tion [D], the deployment of these weapons in space as a BMD
system is prohibited. 3
There is a gap which may allow a party to circumvent this prohi-
bition. Anti-satellites are not specifically prohibited by the Treaty.
They are permitted under the Treaty so long as they are not used
to interfere with a party's "national technical means of verifica-
tion."'I3 Distinguishing between BMD satellites and anti-satellites
using directed energy technology will be difficult, if not impossible.
A party may exploit this gap by orbiting satellites with a dual role
as an anti-satellite and a BMD system while nominally classifying
them as anti-satellites only.13 6
Furthermore, article VII of the Treaty permits parties to up-
grade and modernize existing ABM systems.137 A directed energy
weapon could, therefore, be developed as a fixed land-based ABM
they could not be used for non-military purposes, such as communication, in space. The
Soviet Union has questioned whether particle beams will ever become weapons of mass de-
struction. The United States has rejected the idea that particle beam weapons will ever be
weapons of mass destruction because by their nature, they are "point" weapons. See FY
1984 ARMS CONTROL IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 17, at 268-69.
131 See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
132 See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
3' See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
134 Id.
136
1. For the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with the provisions of this
Treaty, each Party shall use national technical means of verification at its disposal
in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.
2. Each Party undertakes not to interfere with national technical means of verifi-
cation of the other Party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this
Article. . ..
ABM Treaty, supra note 4, at art. XII. See FY 1984 ARMS CONTROL IMPACT STATEMENT,
supra note 17, at 267.
136 See Vlasic, supra note 41, at 177; Deudney, supra note 11, at 101.
1"7 ABM Treaty, supra note 4, at art. VII.
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system. 38 Once the technologies for fixed land-based deployment
are developed, a party might be capable of a rapid deployment of a
similar system in space.
Deployment by one party of directed energy weapons as either
an anti-satellite or a fixed land-based system could provoke with-
drawal from the Treaty by another party under article XV.139
While withdrawal from the Treaty by either party would invite do-
mestic and international criticism,'4 ° the development of directed
energy weapons could be sufficient justification for withdrawal.'
It is preferable, therefore, that both parties discuss the issue of
new BMD systems based on exotic technologies within the frame-
work provided by the Treaty before deployment of such systems. 4 '
3. The Outer Space Treaty
The Outer Space Treaty may pose a number of problems for the
Star Wars Proposal. If directed energy weapons are considered to
be nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction, then
they will be prohibited under the first paragraph of article IV."43
Some authorities have classified directed energy weapons as nu-
clear weapons or weapons of mass destruction."' The basis for this
argument is that directed energy weapons use some of the same
basic principles as nuclear weapons: particle beam weapons destroy
targets by hitting them with rapidly accelerated atomic particles;
high energy lasers use bands of coherent radiation to destroy their
'" See Robinson, GAO, supra note 21, at 16; Robinson, Defense, supra note 21, at 14; see
also FY 1984 ARMS CONTROL IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 17, at 266, 272.
13' ABM Treaty, supra note 4, at art. XV. Article XV(2) permits a party to withdraw
from the Treaty upon six months notice if "extraordinary events" have jeopardized the "su-
preme interests" of the party. Though "extraordinary event" is not defined by the Treaty,
one commentator suggests that the testing of a BMD or an anti-satellite system based on
directed-energy technology would be an "extraordinary event." See Vlasic, supra note 41, at
177.
,' Neither party is, therefore, likely to withdraw unless it has developed a virtually im-
pregnable BMD system. See Nacht, supra note 75, at 155, 165. See also Payne & Gray,
supra note 29, at 832-34.
14 See supra note 139.
"I ABM Treaty, supra note 5, at art. XIII. Article XIII establishes a Standing Consulta-
tive Commission for discussing issues arising under the Treaty. See E. FESSLER, supra note
20, at 75-76.
41 See supra note 81.
144 See Okolie, supra note 75, at 28 (implying that directed energy weapons would be
considered nuclear weapons); see also Zedalis & Wade, supra note 86, at 466 (citing the
Commission for Conventional Armaments definition of weapons of mass destruction). The
directed energy weapon "is ... precisely the type of weapon that paragraph one [of article
IV of the Outer Space Treaty] contemplates." Id.
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targets.1 " One authority believes that the Outer Space Treaty pro-
hibits any "missile killer" regardless of the technology used.146
Other authorities believe that directed energy weapons and some
other types of missile killers are permissible under the Outer Space
Treaty.147 Some authorities believe that although these weapons
use either atomic particles or coherent radiation, they are not nu-
clear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction because they
do not explode like atomic bombs or indiscriminately kill masses of
people. 148 They do not have "characteristics comparable in de-
structive effect" to "atomic explosive devices, radioactive material
weapons, lethal chemical and biological weapons."14 9
Certain types of BMD systems currently contemplated would, by
definition, represent violations; 50 however, they would be viola-
tions only if they were placed in "orbit," "stationed," or "in-
stalled" in outer space.' 5' If a BMD system were launched and
used prior to achieving orbit it would not violate the Outer Space
Treaty. 5 12
The second paragraph of article IV also presents a problem for
"' Okolie and Zedalis & Wade consider directed energy weapons and nuclear weapons to
be based on the same principle. See Okolie, supra note 75, at 28, 30; Zedalis & Wade, supra
note 86, at 455, 466.
' See Gorove, supra note 82, at 116 ("At the same time, an orbiting missile killer or
laser would be prohibited, regardless of whether or not it was intended for defensive or
offensive purposes"). But see E. FESSLER, supra note 20, at 60 (Gorove's statement about
"missile killers" contradicts his classification of weapons of mass destruction).
' See supra note 130 and accompanying text:
Directed energy weapons used in a BMD system would not be used directly against popu-
lations. They are very controllable and can be highly discriminatory. The effect of their
considerable destructive force is limited to their targets, ballistic missiles. See E. FESSLER,
supra note 20, at 55-60, 65-66 (Only a very broad definition of "nuclear weapon or other
weapon of mass destruction" could include directed energy weapons. The usual definition of
nuclear weapon does not include directed energy weapons because there is no explosion.).
148 See E. FESSLER, supra note 20, at 55-60. On the exclusion of directed energy weapons
and other exotic technologies from the definition of "nuclear weapons," see supra note 94.
On "weapon of mass destruction," see supra notes 94, 100.
Although lasers utilize coherent radiation, that radiation is not like the radiation emitted
by the explosion of a nuclear bomb. Even visible light is a form of radiation. For an explana-
tion of the operation of lasers and their radiation, see G. STINE, supra note 11, at 99-101.
'4' Under this view, directed energy weapons do not fit within any of the four categories
of weapon of mass destruction as defined by the Commission for Conventional Armaments.
They are not atomic, or chemical, or biological and, because they are discriminating, "point"
weapons, they do not have "characteristics comparable in destructive effect" to the first
three categories. See supra note 148.
10 The X-ray laser uses a small nuclear explosion to create the beams which would de-
stroy ballistic missiles. See supra note 128.
'6 See supra note 102.
152 Id.
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the Star Wars Proposal. If this peaceful purposes provision is in-
terpreted to permit only non-military uses of space, then it will
prohibit the development of BMD systems in space. If interpreted
to permit all non-aggressive uses of space, any BMD system should
be allowed in space under this paragraph. 153 Even if the first posi-
tion is taken, it will present only a limited obstacle for the Star
Wars Proposal because the peaceful purposes provision of the par-
agraph only applies to the Moon and other celestial bodies 154 and
placement of BMD systems on the Moon and other celestial bodies
is not currently being considered.1 55
C. Summary
The current laws applicable to the Star Wars Proposal present a
number of possible problems. Certain space-based BMD systems
could be tested and deployed without technically violating the
treaties because of the ambiguities within the various treaties, but
any such deployment would violate the spirit of the treaties and
would certainly evoke criticism from the international community.
IV. LEGAL NORM-MAKING IN PROGRESS
The expanding militarization of space has recently caused a
great deal of concern, 15 prompting numerous proposals for ways of
slowing this trend. In 1978 and 1979, the United States and the
Soviet Union conducted negotiations to limit or prevent the use of
anti-satellites. The United States broke off these talks after the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. 5 7 Congress, however, has since in-
troduced four resolutions calling for a resumption of these talks.15
.. 113 BMD systems are by definition defensive systems and, therefore, are arguably permis-
sible under article 51 of the U.N. Charter. See supra notes 116-17.
': See supra note 126.
'55 Id.
156 See Vlasic, supra note 41, at 167; Report of UNISPACE 82, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 101/10,
para. 13, at 5 (Aug. 31, 1982); see Kopal, supra note 57, at 122-23.
167 See Antisatellites, supra note 21, at 11.
'" Two of the resolutions were introduced in the House of Representatives. H.R.J. Res.
87, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) and H.R.J. Res. 120, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) called for
negotiation of a treaty banning all weapons of any kind in space as well as a resumption of
anti-satellite limitation talks.
Two similar resolutions were introduced in the Senate. See S.J. Res. 28, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1983) (identical to H.R.J. Res. 120); S. Res. 43, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
This issue was debated in the House and the Senate during the discussion of the FY 1984
DOD authorization bill. Amendments proposed in the House to defeat funding for anti-
satellite procurement were defeated 177-243. See Antisateflites, supra note 21, at 15.
In the Senate, an amendment was added to S. 675 requiring the President to assure Con-
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While several Congressional resolutions have sought negotiations
of a comprehensive ban on all weapons in space,15 9 other Congres-
sional action has generally favored the militarization of space.16 0
Commentators have echoed the Congressional calls for curbing
the militarization of space. Suggestions range from the expansion
of the Outer Space Treaty1 61 to negotiating a new treaty banning
any future space-based weapons. 62 The strategic significance of a
BMD system seems to require that attempts to limit the growth of
the militarization of space be linked to general disarmament
talks."' 3
Regardless of the method of cooperation chosen, ways of avoid-
ing an escalation of the current militarization of space do exist.164
Several recent United Nations resolutions have recommended ne-
gotiations to either expand the Outer Space Treaty or to draft a
new treaty to halt the militarization of space. 65
gress that the United States is attempting to negotiate an anti-satellite treaty with the Sovi-
ets. See S. Rep. No. 174, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983), reprinted in 1983 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 1081. See also Air Force Test-fires Anti-Satellite Rocket, Atlanta Journal/At-
lanta Constitution, Jan. 22, 1984, at 1, col. 2. Antisatellites, supra note 21, at 15.
Two resolutions in the Senate during the 97th Congress also contained anti-satellite nego-
tiation provisions. See S. Res. 129, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1982). See S. Res. 7, 97th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1982)(calling for the negotiation of a Protocol to the Outer Space Treaty to add a
provision banning anti-satellites).
"" During the 97th session of Congress, Senators Moakley and Matsunaga introduced two
resolutions which favored a peaceful use of outer space. See H.R. J. Res. 607, 97th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1983)(calling for negotiation for a treaty completely banning weapons from the space
arena); S. Res. 488, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1983)(calling for an attempt to establish an inter-
national space station as opposed to national, militarized space stations).
During the 98th session of Congress, H.R. J. Res. 120, 98th Cong. 1st Sess. (1983) called
for opening negotiations to expand the Outer Space Treaty to ban all weapons from space.
Resolutions calling for cooperation in space rather than armed competition were also intro-
duced. See S. Con. Res. 16, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); see also H. R. Con. Res. 140, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
100 See Department of Defense Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 97-252, 96 Stat. 718 (1982);
Department of Defense Authorization Act, Pub. L. 98-94, 97 Stat. 614 (1983).
See S. Res. 100, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983)(introduced by Senators Wallop and Laxalt,
calling for increased funding for a space-based BMD system); see also People Protection
Act, H.R. 3073, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983)(calling for an acceleration of the development of
directed energy weapons).
101 See Christol, Article Four of the 1967 Principles Treaty: Its Meaning and Prospects
for Its Clarification, 21 PROC. OF COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 203 (1978).
102 See Gorove, supra note 88, at 95-96.
103 See Hasselman, supra note 40, at 100.
10, See Galloway, supra note 90, at 92, 95-96; see also Andelman, Space Wars, 44 FOR-
EIGN POL'Y 94, 104-06 (1981)(discussing three options which the United States may wish to
follow in resolving the Space War issue. One option is to negotiate with the Soviet Union).
See generally Karas, supra note 40.
1" See Resolutions adopted by the General Assembly during the 10th Special Session
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V. CONCLUSION
The treaties applicable to the Star Wars Proposal, are filled with
ambiguities, allowing a nation planning to deploy a space-based
BMD system to argue that it will not be in violation of any agree-
ment. A nation deploying such systems could also choose to with-
draw from the more restrictive treaties. In either case, the deploy-
ment of a space-based BMD system would result in an
international outcry against such deployment. While research and
development of such systems is, arguably, permissible under the
letter of the applicable treaties, the spirit of the treaties represents
an international hostility toward the militarization of space. The
Star Wars Proposal itself has already prompted stormy debate.
Before progressing any further, the legal and political implications
of the Star Wars Proposal should be submitted to bilateral and
multilateral discussion.
John Topping
(May 23 - June 30, 1978) GAOR Tenth Special Session, SuppI. No. 4 A/S.10/4, Chpt. IV,
para. 50 (1978 resolutions expressing a fear of the "tremendous militarization of outer
space"); U.N. Doc. CD/9 (Mar. 1979)(Italian draft protocol to the 1967 Outer Space Treaty
would extend Article IV to all weapons, not merely weapons of mass destruction.); U.N.
Doc. A/C.1/26/PU.23, at 22-36 (statement of the Netherlands on Nov. 3, 1981 to the 1st
Committee); U.N. Doc. A/S-10/AC.1/7 (June 1, 1978)(Memorandum from the French Gover-
ment concerning an International Satellite Monitoring Agency); see generally Almond, The
French Proposal for an International Satellite Monitoring Agency, 25 PROC. OF THE COLLO-
QUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 171 (1982).
See Soviet draft treaty, U.N. Doc. A/Res./36/192 (Aug. 20, 1981); Goedhuis, Some Obser-
vations on the Efforts to Prevent a Military Escalation in Outer Space, 10 J. SPACE L. 13,
21 (1982). See also Russell, Military Activities in Outer Space: Soviet Legal Views, 25
HARV. INT'L L.J. 153, 187-91 (1984). In August of 1983 Soviet Premier Andropov stated to
nine visiting United States senators that he favored a "complete prohibition of the testing
and development of any space-based weapons for military targets on Earth, in the air, or in
outer space." See Antisatellites, supra note 21, at 12. See generally Menter, supra note 117,
at 541-44.
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